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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
LUETTA K. LISKA, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
MICHAEL A. LISKA, 
Defendant/Appellant 
JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear and determine this matter pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(k). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Whether the District Court should have sustained the Commissioner's recommendation 
to decline jurisdiction based upon findings which are not supported by any record or 
evidence. This issue is a mixed question of fact and law. The standards of review are 
"substantial evidence" for the question of fact and "correction of error" for the question of 
law. See George v. Peterson, 671 P.2d 208 (Utah 1983) (factual issues); Western Kane 
County Special Serv. Dist. No. 1 v. Jackson Cattle Co., 744 P.2d 1376 (Utah 1987) (legal 
issues). 
2. Whether the District Court's adoption of the Commissioner's recommendation to decline 
jurisdiction which was based solely upon communication with another state's trial court 
magistrate of which no record was kept and in which Defendant did not participate violates 
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the notice and opportunity to be heard provision of the Utah Uniform Child Custody 
Jurisdiction Act. This issue is strictly a question of law and is reviewable under the 
"correction of error" standard. See Western Kane County Special Serv. Dist. No. 1 v. Jackson 
Cattle Co.} 744 P.2d 1376 (Utah 1987); In re D.S.K, 792 P.2d 118 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
3. Whether the process used by the District Court in which a Commissioner conducts a 
conference call with another state's trial court magistrate deprives the appellant of fhis right to 
due process of law. This issue is strictly a question of law and is reviewable under the 
"correction of error" standard. See Western Kane County Special Serv. Dist. No. 1 v. Jackson 
Cattle Co., 744 P.2d 1376 (Utah 1987); In re D.S.K, 792 P.2d 118 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
4. Whether the process used by the District Court in which a Commissioner conducts a 
conference call with another state's trial court magistrate violates the Open Courts provision 
of Utah's Constitution. This issue is strictly a question of law and is reviewable under the 
"correction of error" standard. See Western Kane County Special Serv. Dist. No. 1 v. Jackson 
Cattle Co., 744 P.2d 1376 (Utah 1987); In re D.S.K, 792 P.2d 118 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
Article L Section 7, Utah Constitution. 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law. 
Article L Section 11, Utah Constitution. 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his person, 
property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which shall be 
administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred from 
prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this State, by himself or counsel, any 
civil cause to which he is a party. 
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Section 78-45c-4. Utah Code Annotated. 
Before making a decree under this act, reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard 
shall be given to the contestants, any parent whose rights have not been previously 
terminated, and any person who has physical custody of the child. If any of these 
persons is outside the state, notice and opportunity to be heard shall be given pursuant 
to Section 78-45c-5. 
Section 78-45c-7. Utah Code Annotated. 
(1) A court which has jurisdiction under this act to make an initial or modification 
decree may decline to exercise its jurisdiction any time before making a decree if it 
finds that it is an inconvenient forum to make a custody determination under the 
circumstances of the case and that a court of another state is a more appropriate forum. 
(2) A finding of inconvenient forum may be made upon the court's own motion or 
upon motion of a party or a guardian ad litem or other representative of the child. 
(3) In determining if it is an inconvenient forum, the court shall consider if it is in the 
interest of the child that another state assume jurisdiction. For this purpose it may take 
into account the following factors, among others: 
(a) If another state is or recently was the child's home state; 
(b) If another state has a closer connection with the child and his family or 
with the child and one or more of the contestants; 
(c) If substantial evidence concerning the child's present or future care, 
protection, training, and personal relationships is more readily available in 
another state; 
(d) If the parties have agreed on another forum which is no less appropriate; 
and 
(e) If the exercise of jurisdiction by a court of this state would contravene any 
of the purposes stated in section 78-45c-l. 
(4) Before determining whether to decline or retain jurisdiction the court may 
communicate with a court of another state and exchange information pertinent to the 
assumption of jurisdiction by either court with a view to assuring that jurisdiction will 
be exercised by the more appropriate court and that a forum will be available to the 
parties. 
(5) If the court finds that it is an inconvenient forum and that a court of another state 
is a more appropriate forum, it may dismiss the proceedings, or it may stay the 
proceedings upon condition that a custody proceeding be promptly commenced in 
another named state or upon any other conditions which may be just and proper, 
including the condition that a moving party stipulate his consent and submission to the 
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jurisdiction of the other forum. 
(6) The court may decline to exercise its jurisdiction under this act if a custody 
determination is incidental to an action for divorce or another proceeding while 
retaining jurisdiction over the divorce or other proceeding. 
(7) If it appears to the court that it is clearly an inappropriate forum it may require 
the party who commenced the proceedings to pay, in addition to the costs of the 
proceedings in this state, necessary travel and other expenses, including attorney's fees, 
incurred by other parties or their witnesses. Payment is to be made to the clerk of the 
court for remittance to the proper party. 
(8) Upon dismissal or stay of proceedings under this section the court shall inform the 
court found to be the more appropriate forum of this fact, or if the court which would 
have jurisdiction in the other state is not certainly known, shall transmit the 
information to the court administrator or other appropriate official for forwarding to 
the appropriate court. 
(9) Any communication received from another state informing this state of a finding 
of inconvenient forum because a court of this state is the more appropriate forum shall 
be filed in the custody registry of the appropriate court. Upon assuming jurisdiction 
the court of this state shall inform the original court of this fact. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This appeal is from a final order of the Third District Court sustaining the 
recommendation of the Commissioner to defer jurisdiction to Colorado under the Utah 
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act. 
Statement of Facts 
1. Plaintiff/Appellee Luetta Liska and Defendant/Appellant Mike Liska resided in Salt 
Lake County before January 1989 as husband and wife. Mike Liska currently resides in Utah. 
(R00307, R00371). 
2. Luetta Liska moved with the parties' two minor children to Loveland, Colorado, early 
in 1989. (R00044). 
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3. Luetta Liska filed for divorce in the Third District Court of Utah on or about January 
26, 1989. (R00002-11). 
4. A number of orders and recommendations were entered by the Utah court and a final 
decree of divorce was made and entered in October 1990. (R00060-62, R00079, R00106, 
R00120-22, R00123-24, R000126, R00177, R00181, R00192, R00196, R00199, R00318-24). 
5. The divorce decree provided for Mike Liska's visitation with his children. (R00319). 
6. Beginning in November 1990, Mike Liska experienced difficulty in exercising normal 
court ordered visitation with his children. (R00371-80). 
7. Luetta Liska filed an action in Colorado seeking orders to prevent Mike Liska from 
exercising his scheduled visitation in June 1992. (R00400-02). Ultimately, the orders were 
dissolved. (R00441-45).1 
8. Mike Liska filed an Order to Show Cause to enforce his visitation rights in the Third 
District Court on March 18, 1993. (R00476-77). 
9. A hearing was set for Mike Liska's Order to Show Cause. However, upon hearing that 
an emergency order had been filed in Colorado and before any arguments had been made, the 
Commissioner declined to rule on Mike Liska's Order to Show Cause and indicated that she 
was going to confer with the Colorado court. (R00446). 
10. The Commissioner entered a minute entry May 11, 1993 deferring jurisdiction. The 
minute entry indicated that communication with the Colorado court had occurred. (R00472-
73). 
1
 The record contains an apparently misfiled separate order in the middle of the dissolution 
order at R00442. 
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11. Mike Liska objected to the Commissioner's recommendation on May 24, 1993. 
(R00478-84). 
12. The trial court stayed the Commissioner's recommendation on June 1, 1993 based 
upon Mike Liska's objection. (R00485-86). 
13. On August 16, 1993, the trial court referred the case to the Commissioner for findings 
of fact in support of the recommendation to decline jurisdiction. The minute entry reflecting 
this order did not appear in the official court file. Therefore, the trial court entered an order 
on November 15, 1993 reflecting the action taken on August 16. (R00515-16). 
14. On December 14, 1993, the Commissioner made findings concerning her 
recommendation to decline the exercise of Utah jurisdiction. (R00524-25). 
15. Over Mike Liska's objection, the trial court adopted the Commissioner's 
recommendation on February 7, 1994 (minute entry dated January 18, 1994), and stayed all 
Utah proceedings. The trail court's stated that its order constituted a Rule 54(b) judgment. 
(R00529, R00530-31). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
I 
The Commissioner made a recommendation that the Utah courts defer jurisdiction to 
Colorado. This recommendation was accompanied by findings that were not supported by 
evidence. The trial court sustained the Commissioner's recommendation without reviewing 
the basis for it. Commissioners are empowered to "recommend" not "decide." Therefore, the 
trial court should have undertaken an independent review of the findings. Absent such 
review, the trial court's sustaining of the Commissioner's recommendation was improper. 
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II. 
The procedure used by the Commissioner violated the notice and opportunity to be 
heard provision of the Utah Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act. The Commissioner 
communicated with the Colorado courts without maintaining a record or giving Mike Liska an 
opportunity to be present. As a quasi-judicial officer, the Commissioner is required to follow 
certain procedures to protect Mike Liska's rights. Because the procedure used by the 
Commissioner violated the notice and opportunity to be heard requirement of the Utah 
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, the trial court's sustaining of the Commissioner's 
recommendation to defer jurisdiction was improper. 
III. 
Mike Liska has certain interests that are protected by the Due Process clause of the 
Utah Constitution. These interests include the right to his relationship with his children and 
the right of access to Utah courts. By recommending deferral of jurisdiction to Colorado, the 
Commissioner determined that Utah would not offer Mike Liska a forum to protect these 
rights. Since Mike Liska was not afforded any opportunity to participate in the 
Commissioner's proceedings to determine if deferral of jurisdiction should be recommended, 
his protected rights were denied without due process of law. Therefore, the acceptance of 
the recommendation by the trial court was unconstitutional. 
IV. 
Mike Liska also has constitutional claims under the Open Courts provision. By 
refusing to enforce a Utah order for visitation, Mike Liska has been denied a remedy of an 
injury to his "person, property, or reputation." The nature of this denial merits heightened 
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scrutiny of his claims because his rights have been completely impaired and his relationship 
with his children (a constitutionally protected interest) is affected. The statute which allowed 
deferral of jurisdiction over his request for enforcement of visitation under a Utah divorce 
decree deprives him of access to Utah courts. The legislature has provided no effective and 
reasonable alternative for vindication of his rights. Further, deferral of jurisdiction in this 
case is arbitrary and unreasonable means of pursuing the statutory objectives. 
Mike Liska has a second claim under the Open Courts provision. The Commissioner's 
proceedings to determine whether to recommend deferral of jurisdiction were made without 
affording Mike Liska access. Therefore, the procedure used by the Commissioner violated the 
constitutional mandate that "All courts shall be open." 
ARGUMENT2 
I. THE RECORD AND EVIDENCE SUPPORTING THE COMMISSIONER'S 
RECOMMENDATION ARE INADEQUATE AND THEREFORE THE TRIAL 
COURT'S ADOPTION OF THE RECOMMENDATION WAS IN ERROR. 
The Commissioner made her recommendation based upon the Utah Uniform Child 
Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA or Act). UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-45c-l to 26 (1992 & 
Supp. 1993). Section 7 of the UCCJA allows a court to decline to exercise jurisdiction in 
favor of another court with jurisdiction. Id. § 78-45c-7 (1992). Based upon the 
Commissioners recommendation, the trial judge entered an order deferring jurisdiction over 
Mike Liska's request for enforcement of visitation. 
2
 Plaintiff/Appellee has not participated in these proceedings previously. If she does not file 
a brief, Defendant/Appellant's counsel plans to file a list of cases, in the form prescribed 
in UTAH R. APP. P. 24(j), contrary to some of Defendant/Appellant's arguments. This list 
is intended to help the Court to evaluate Defendant/Appellant's argument. 
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Although Utah courts have not addressed the issue directly, other jurisdictions have 
held that a decision to decline jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act 
is within the trial court's discretion. See e.g. Brown v. Brown, 486 A.2d 1116 (Conn. 1985); 
In re. Bolton, 690 P.2d 401 (Mont. 1984). Assuming that Utah would reach a similar 
conclusion, the trial court is still required to make adequate findings of fact based upon the 
evidence to support its exercise of discretion. This Court has addressed the necessity of the 
trial court establishing an adequate record in a similar area of trial court discretion, child 
custody determinations. Smith v. Smith, 726 P.2d 423 (Utah 1986). 
Proper findings of fact ensure that the ultimate custody award follows logically 
from, and is supported by, the evidence and the controlling legal principles. 
Adequate findings are also necessary for this Court to perform its assigned 
review function. 
Id. at 426. Without a proper foundation in record and evidence, the findings made by the 
Commissioner and adopted by the trial court when it sustained the Commissioner's 
recommendation are inadequate.3 
Appellant suggests that it is appropriate to require an evidentiary hearing concerning 
issues of deferral. The Supreme Court of Hawaii found that a trial court order stating that 
Hawaii was an inconvenient forum was unfounded because no evidentiary hearing was 
conducted. Allen v. Allen, 645 P.2d 300, 307 (Hawaii 1982) (dicta).4 The nature of domestic 
3
 Mike Liska recognizes that generally a party challenging a trial court's findings of fact 
is required to marshal all the evidence supporting the findings and demonstrate the 
evidence's insufficiency. Scharf v. BMG Corporation, 700 P.2d 1068, 1069-70 (Utah 
1985). However, the lack of a record of the Commissioner's fact finding makes this 
support impossible. 
4
 The court's discussion of the forum non conveniens provision of the Uniform Child 
Custody Jurisdiction Act was unnecessary because the court determined that Hawaii did 
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relations commissioners1 authority requires that the recommendations made be subject to de 
novo review when a party objects. Commissioners are empowered to "recommend' in areas 
prescribed by the Judicial Council and may not enter final orders unless provided by law or 
the Judicial Council. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3-3l(6)(b)(i) & (9) (1992). Commissioners may 
make "recommendations" in domestic relations matters but may not make final adjudications 
except in default or uncontested divorces.5 UTAH CODE OF JUDICIAL ADMIN. R. 6-401(2)(D) & 
(6)(A). The Utah Supreme Court has found commissioners to be "analogous" to masters 
appointed pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 53. Plumb v. State, 809 P.2d 734, 743 
(Utah 1990). The court's potential responses to a master's report in a non-jury action are as 
follows: 
The court after hearing may adopt the report or may modify it or may reject it 
in whole or in part or may receive further evidence or may recommit it with 
instructions. 
UTAH R. CIV. P. 53(e)(2) (emphasis added). Rule 53 outlines an appropriate proceeding for a 
court's review of non-binding recommendations. In contrast, an adoption of the 
Commissioner's recommendation without an independent evidentiary hearing on Mike Liska's 
objection is equivalent of rubber stamping the Commissioner's recommendation ancl allowing 
the Commissioner to make the final order. 
not have jurisdiction over the custody dispute. 
5
 One judge of this Court has opined that allowing commissioners to issue any orders may 
be an unconstitutional vesting of judicial power. Holm v. Smilowitz, 840 P.2d 157, 167 
n.5 (Russon, J.). 
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II THE TRIAL COURT'S ADOPTION OF THE COMMISSIONER'S 
RECOMMENDATION VIOLATED THE NOTICE AND OPPORTUNITY TO 
BE HEARD PROVISIONS OF THE UTAH UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY 
JURISDICTION ACT. 
All decrees under the UCCJA must give parents "reasonable notice and opportunity to 
be heard" to be valid. Id. § 78-45c-4 (1992). Mike Liska and his attorney were not present 
at the only information gathering phase of the proceedings surrounding Mike Liska's Order to 
Show Cause, i.e. communication with the Colorado magistrate. Further, contrary to this 
Court's admonition concerning communication with other states pursuant to Section 7, the 
Commissioner failed to "make a prompt written record of [her] conclusions and . . . [set forth] 
the basis for any agreement . . . clearly in the record." In re. D.S.K., 792 P.2d 118, 127-28 
n.9 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); Allen, 645 P.2d at 307 (substance of conversation of Hawaian court 
with New Jersey court should ahve been made a matteer of record). 
Other jurisdictions have considered the process required by Section 4 of the Uniform 
Act. Maintenance of a record is essential, even in the sensitive area of questioning children. 
See Shapiro v. Shapiro, 458 A.2d 1257 (Md Ct. App. 1983) (interview of child without 
consent or presence of parent proper if record kept). Evidentiary hearings are required to give 
the parties an opportunity to be heard. See Swartsell v. Swartsell, 615 So. 2d 825 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1993) (per curiam) (temporary custody order); Vogt v. Altman, 428 So. 2d 267 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (order after interviewing daughter and psychiatrist without allowing 
father to put on rebuttal evidence improper); Moran v. Moran, 612 A.2d 1075 (Perin. Super. 
1992) (trial court erred by not holding hearing before adopting conciliator's agreement). 
Domestic Relations Commissioners are quasi-judicial officers of the court. UTAH CODE 
ANN. §78-3-31 (1992); UTAH CODE OF JUDICIAL ADMIN. R. 3-201. The Supreme Court has 
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addressed the record keeping requirements of quasi-judicial officers. Plumb v. State, 809 P.2d 
734 (Utah 1990). The trial court in Plumb appointed a special master pursuant to Utah Rule 
of Civil Procedure 53 (the scope of the master's appointment was strongly contested). The 
master recommended to the trial court that the fees awarded to the class counsel under a class 
action settlement be reduced. One of the bases of the class counsel's objections to the 
recommendation was the nature of the proceedings conducted by the master. The class 
counsel was never given notice of the reassessment of the fee award by the master. Also, the 
class counsel was not given an opportunity to present any evidence on the issue until after the 
recommendation to the judge. The Supreme Court found that the trial court abused its 
discretion6 by adopting the findings of the master after being informed of the lack of notice 
and insufficient opportunity to be heard. Id. at 743. 
Another aspect of Plumb is relevant in this case. The Supreme Court indicated that 
evidence presented by the class counsel demonstrated that the special master had engaged in 
ex parte communication with the trial judge and other people not parties to the case. The 
court suggested that such conduct, if substantiated, would be "clearly improper." Id. at 742. 
The special master was subject to the ethical obligations of other judicial officers. Id. at 743. 
However, the court did not base its decision on the possible ex parte communications; 
instead, it relied upon the lack of notice and opportunity to be heard discussed above. Id. 
Plumb is highly persuasive in the case before the Court. The Supreme Court noted 
6
 The court noted that the procedures used by the master may have violated due process. 
Plumb, 809 P.2d at 743 ("Regardless of whether the procedures in this case are so 
extreme as to deny class counsel the due process guaranteed under article I, section 7, we 
find that, at a minimum, the trial court abused its discretion . . . .) (footnote omitted; 
emphasis added). 
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that the special master is "most analogous" to a commissioner. Id. Much of the conduct 
censured by the court in Plumb has occurred in this case. The trial court, by accepting the 
Commissioner's recommendation, decided to deny Mike Liska recourse in Utah courts without 
a hearing. This decision violated the requirements of the UCC JA that notice and opportunity 
to be heard be granted before any decree is entered. Also, the Commissioner conferred with 
the Colorado court ex parte and failed to record the conversation. Mike Liska suggest that 
the flaws in the procedure used by the Commissioner so tainted her recommendation that 
acceptance of the recommendation was error as a matter of law. 
III. THE PROCEDURE USED BY THE COMMISSIONER TO DETERMINE THAT 
UTAH COURTS WOULD NOT EXERCISE JURISDICTION VIOLATED 
APPELLANT'S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS UNDER THE UTAH 
CONSTITUTION. 
A. Appellant possesses rights protected by the Due Process clause of the Utah 
Constitution. 
The Utah Constitution ensures that "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 
property, without due process of law." UTAH CONST, art. I, sec. 7. The issues in this case 
involve procedural due process. "Most due process cases concern procedural requirements, 
notably notice and opportunity to be heard, which must be observed in order to have a valid 
proceeding affecting life, liberty, or property." Wells v. Children's Aid Society of Utah, 681 
P.2d 199, 204 (Utah 1984) (emphasis in original; citations omitted). The procedure necessary 
varies depending upon the case and the parties involved. Rupp v. Grantsville City, 610 P.2d 
338, 341 (Utah 1980) ("The demands of due process rest on the concept of basic fairness of 
procedure and demand a procedure appropriate to the case and just to the parties involved."). 
The due process clause of the Utah Constitution is implicated any time the government 
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makes factual determinations affecting a person's fundamental interests. Concerned 
Parents of Stepchildren v. Mitchell, 645 P.2d 629, 636 (Utah 1982). In this case, two 
fundamental interests of Mike Liska are implicated. The first fundamental interest held by 
Mike Liska is the right to visitation with his children. The Supreme Court has recognized 
that the parent-child relationship is fundamental right. In re J.P., 648 P.2d 1364 (Utah 1982). 
As the noncustodial parent, Mike Liska's relationship with his children is sustained by 
visitation ordered by the Utah court in the 1990 divorce decree. This right to visitation is 
fundamental and should not be abrogated without due process. See Barron v. Barron, 834 
P.2d 685, 688 (Wyo. 1992) ("Husband had a legitimate liberty interest in these visitation 
rights which was protected by the Constitution of the United States, and by the Constitution 
of the State of Wyoming.") (footnotes omitted).7 
The second protected interest possessed by Mike Liska is the right to access to the 
courts protected by the Open Courts provision of the Utah Constitution. UTAH CONST, art. I, 
sec. II.8 The recognition of the right to access to court in the Constitution elevates the right 
to one of "life, liberty or property" protected by the due process clause. See McGrew v. 
Industrial Comm'n, 85 P.2d 608, 610 (Utah 1938) quoting Campbell v. Holt, 115 U.S. 620 
(1885) ("The words "life,' liberty,' and 'property' are constitutional terms, and are to be taken 
7
 Wyoming's due process clause is identical to Utah's. 
8
 The Open Courts provision states 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to* him in his 
person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which 
shall be administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be 
barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this State, by himself 
or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party. 
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in their broadest sense.") (emphasis deleted). The due process and access to courts clauses in 
the Utah Constitution are complementary but not duplicative. Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 
Ill P.2d 670, 675 (Utah 1985). 
B. Appellant's fundamental rights have been deprived without due process of law. 
The Commissioner in this case decided that the Utah courts would not hear Mike 
Liska's motion to enforce visitation set out in a previous order by a Utah court. This decision 
was based upon a conference with the Colorado court to which Mike Liska was not a party 
and of which no record was kept. In another case before this court concerning the UCCJA, 
the court held that due process required a hearing before a undomesticated foreign order could 
be enforced. Holm v. Smilowitz, 840 P.2d 157 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
Holm involved Section 6 of the Act that requires a court to stay a proceeding if a 
custody proceeding is pending in another jurisdiction. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45c-6 (1992). 
The parties were divorced in Ohio but both had moved from that state. The mother moved to 
Utah with the parties' child and filed the Ohio divorce decree under the Utah Foreign 
Judgment Act. The father (a North Carolina resident) had filed a petition for change of 
custody in Ohio. Although the mother had not been properly served, the Ohio court granted 
the father's petition. The father entered Utah with the Ohio order (not filed under the Utah 
Foreign Judgment Act) and demanded that custody be relinquished to him. The mother's 
attorney contacted the Commissioner who said that Utah would not assume jurisdiction. A 
later conversation between the mother's attorney and the Commissioner indicated that the 
commissioner had discussed the case with the judge and that the Ohio order would be 
enforced. The father assumed custody of the child and left the state. This court determined 
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that the mother's due process rights had been violated. Since full faith and credit is only 
afforded to orders issued with jurisdiction, the mother was entitled to a hearing on the 
jurisdiction of the Ohio court. Holm, 840 P.2d at 164-65. 
The Supreme Court of Delaware decided a case similar to this one in 1991. Yost v. 
Johnson, 591 A.2d 178 (Del. 1991) (copy attached). The parties were divorced in 
Pennsylvania, and the mother was granted custody of the children. The mother moved to 
Virginia; the father moved to Delaware. A Virginia court modified the visitation schedule. 
Subsequent to the modification, the mother moved to Italy. During one visit, the father 
sought a modification of the Virginia decree in Delaware and did not return the chjldren to 
the mother. After denying the mother's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction, the Delaware court awarded the father custody. The Delaware court accepted 
jurisdiction based upon a conversation with the Virginia court in which the Virginia judge 
deferred to Delaware.9 The mother claimed that the trial court violated her due process rights 
by contacting the Virginia court without notifying her, by failing to allow the parties to 
participate in the telephone call, and by not creating a record of the call. The court 
determined that due process was violated by the judge's contact with the Virginia court. Id. at 
182. 
[T]he trial judge had a fundamental duty to notify the parties of the intended 
communication in advance, and to permit them to meaningfully participate in 
the discussion. Anything less does not comport with basic principles of due 
process. 
9
 Unlike this case, Yost involved Section 3(4) of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction 
Act. Section 3(4) allows a court to assume jurisdiction if no other state has jurisdiction 
or a court with jurisdiction declines to exercise jurisdiction. 
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Id. The court noted that even if an emergency situation requiring the ex parte contact existed 
the judge should have maintained a record of the communication and allow the parties to be 
heard on the issues later. Id. Because the trial court failed to provide the mother jvith 
adequate notice and opportunity to be heard, the court's actions were unconstitutional. Id. 
The violation of Mike Liska's right to due process of law is not cured by the 
availability of the Colorado forum. While the Utah Constitution does not require "due 
process of law" to be provided by judicial action, it requires that the protection be provided 
by the State of Utah. See e.g. Lindon City v. Engineers Construction Co., 636 P.2d 1070, 
1074-75 (Utah 1981) (due process provided by Arbitration Act and therefore contract agreeing 
to binding arbitration was constitutionally permissible). The State of Utah has no ability to 
affect the remedies provided by another jurisdiction including Colorado. Therefore, the state 
can not rely upon another jurisdiction to afford "due process of law." 
Mike Liska was entitled to due process of law before he was deprived of his rights of 
access to the courts and enforcement of his relationship with his children. The procedure 
involved in the decision to defer to Colorado jurisdiction was not sufficient to protect Mike 
Liska. Therefore, the trial court's acceptance of the Commissioner's recommendation was unconstitutional. 
IV. THE PROCEDURE USED BY THE COMMISSIONER TO DETERMINE THAT 
UTAH COURTS WOULD NOT EXERCISE JURISDICTION VIOLATED THE 
OPEN COURTS PROVISION OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
Utah's Constitution contains the following Open Courts provision: 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his 
person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which 
shall be administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall 
be barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this State, by 
himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party. 
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UTAH CONST, art. I, sec. 11. This provision "guarantees access to the courts and a judicial 
procedure that is based on fairness and equality." Berry, 111 P.2d at 675. Under Section 11, 
persons are entitled to a remedy by "due course of law" for injuries to "person, property, or 
reputation." Id. Mike Liska makes two related claims under the Open Courts provision. The 
first is that the section of the UCCJA allowing Utah courts to defer its jurisdiction in favor of 
another state with jurisdiction violates the Constitution. The second is that the process by 
which the trial court and Commissioner declined jurisdiction in this case is unconstitutional. 
Mike Liska has suffered injury to his "person, property, or reputation." Section 11 is 
concerned with "the availability of legal remedies for vindicating the great interest that 
individuals in a civilized society have in the integrity of their person, property, and 
reputations." Id. at 677 n.4. Appellant has encountered repeated difficulty in enforcing his 
visitation rights with his children as ordered by a Utah court. As discussed above in the due 
process analysis, Mike Liska's constitutionally protected relationship with his children is 
sustained through visitation. The important nature of the parent-child relationship should 
compel consideration of an impairment of it to be an injury to Mike Liska's "person." Even if 
the injury in not considered one to Mike Liska's "person," it certainly is encompassed in 
"injury . . . in his . . . property." "Property" under the Open Courts provision "denotes a 
broad range of interests that are secured by existing rules or understandings.'" Celebrity Club 
Inc. v. Liquor Control Comm% 657 P.2d 1293, 1297 (Utah 1982) quoting Perry v. 
Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601 (1972). 
The Open Courts provision restricts the power of the courts and the judiciary. Berry, 
111 P.2d at 675. The focus of recent Utah appellate cases has been upon legislative 
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enactments. E.g. Horton v. Goldminer's Daughter, 785 P.2d 1087 (Utah 1989) (statute of 
repose); Celebrity Club, 657 P.2d 1293 (Utah 1982) (statute allowing deprivation of liquor 
store lease without notice, hearing or judicial review). However, judicial actions are equally 
constrained. See Kish v. Wright, 562 P.2d 625 (Utah 1977) (dismissing a civil rights case 
with prejudice on the basis of forum non conveniens contrary to state constitution); see also 
Note, "Utah's Emerging Constitutional Weapon — The Open Courts Provision: Condemarin v. 
University Hospital" 1990 B.Y.U.L.R. 1107, 1109 n.20 (the history of open courts provisions 
indicates that they were intended as a "uniquely judicial guarantee") (emphasis deleted). 
A. The Court should apply heightened scrutiny to Mike Liska's claims under the 
Open Courts provision. 
The Utah appellate jurisprudence on the Open Courts provision has been active 
recently. This Court has viewed Supreme Court precedent as implicating heightened scrutiny 
for cases under the Open Courts provision. Currier v. Holden, 862 P.2d 1357, 1362-63 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1993). Generally, legislative enactments are entitled to a strong presumption of 
validity. Id. at 1362 citing City ofMonticello v. Christensen, 788 P.2d 513, 516 (Utah 
1990).10 However, the level of scrutiny is raised when protected interests are implicated. Id. 
at 1362.11 The level of review is determined by a study of two factors: the degree of 
10
 Justice Zimmerman has expressed the opinion that the burden shifts to the proponent to 
justify limitation of access to the state courts. Currier, 862 P.2d at 1366 n.14. In a case 
decided approximately two months after Currier, Justice Zimmerman, joined by Chief 
Justice Hall, repeated the assertion that statutes challenged under the Open Courts 
provision are presumptively unconstitutional. Lee v. Gaufin, 867 P.2d 572, 591 (Utah 
1993) (Zimmerman, J. concurring in result). 
11
 Analysis under the Open Courts provision has been reinvigorated since the 1985 decision 
of Berry v. Beech Aircraft. No \>os\-Berry cases was found discussing levels of scrutiny 
of judicial (as distinct from legislative) action. This Court has implied that an abuse of 
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impairment of remedy and the nature of the right impaired. Id. at 1363. 
A Utah court has the jurisdiction to enforce visitation ordered in a Utah divorce 
decree. By deferring to the Colorado court, Mike Liska's right to have the Utah decree 
enforced in Utah courts has been completely impaired. Therefore, the first criteria set out in 
Currier supports review under a higher level of scrutiny. 
As discussed above, Mike Liska's right to visitation emanates from the parent-child 
relationship. By refusing to allow him enforcement of that right in Utah, a constitutionally 
protected right is impaired. Thus, the second criteria in Currier also supports heightened 
scrutiny. 
B. Section 7fs empowerment of courts to defer its jurisdiction to another state's 
courts violates the Open Courts provision. 
Mike Liska's first claim under the Open Courts provisions that allowing the trial court 
to defer jurisdiction to the Colorado court denied Mike Liska "remedy by due course of 
law."12 In Berry, the Utah Supreme Court established a two prong test for analyzing claims 
under the Open Courts provision. First, the court must determine if the law provides an 
effective and reasonable alternative remedy "by due course of law" for vindication of the 
constitutional interest. Berry, 111 P.2d at 680. Second, if no substitute or alternative remedy 
is provided, abrogation of the remedy is justified only if a clear social or economic evil is to 
discretion standard of review applies to decisions under Section 7 of the UCCJA. Trent 
v. Trent, 735 P.2d 382, 383 (Utah 1987) (upholding decision not to defer jurisdiction 
stating that the court did not abuse its authority). The rationale that dictates a higher level 
of scrutiny for statutes impairing significant interest applies to judicial actions. Therefore, 
Appellant assumes that heightened scrutiny of judicial actions is appropriate. 
12
 This claim actually has narrow and broad aspect. This Court can invalidate Section 7 
entirely or it can find that the deferral in this case was invalid. 
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be eliminated and elimination of the existing legal remedy is not an arbitrary or unreasonable 
means of achieving the objective. Id. 
Under Berry the Court must first determine if the law has provided Mike Liska with 
an effective and reasonable alternative remedy safeguarding his constitutionally protected 
relationship with his children by due course of law. The fact that the Colorado court is 
exercising jurisdiction over Mike Liska's children does not cure the constitutional defects in 
the process used by the trial court. See Coman v. Thomas Manufacturing Co., 381 S.E.2d 
445, 446 (N.C. 1989) (although an individual may have additional remedy in federal courts, 
under open courts constitutional provision state courts can not fail to provide a forum). 
The difference between the remedy provided in Utah and remedy provided in Colorado 
has been recognized by the Supreme Court. The court in discussed the difference between 
transferring a case within the state and dismissing under forum non conveniens. Summa 
Corp. v. Lancer Indus., Inc., 559 P.2d 544 (Utah 1977). 
In [a transfer situation], the defendant's motion is at least offering the plaintiff 
the opportunity of a trial in another court. But, the granting of a motion to 
dismiss on the ground of forum non conveniens defeats the instant action 
entirely. It turns the plaintiff out of court, and leaves him without remedy 
except if he chooses to go to Florida, or some other state where the defendant 
does business, and go through the process of instituting another lawsuit. 
Id. at 546. Admittedly, Mike Liska will not have to institute another lawsuit to attempt to 
enforce the Utah decree in Colorado. However, he will need to go to a different jurisdiction 
and file the necessary motions to enforce his visitation, a process tantamount to filing a new 
action. 
Utah courts can utilize forum non conveniens in appropriate cases. However, under 
policy emanating from, among other sources, the Open Courts provision, the court's discretion 
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is limited to "compelling circumstances." Id. at 546. These circumstances are where it 
appears plaintiff has selected the forum to annoy or harass the defendant or factors of 
inconvenience so preponderate against the case in Utah in favor of courts elsewhere. Id. 
However, this case requires of an even more conservative approach. Unlike the contract 
dispute at issue in Summa, the protection of Mike Liska's visitations has substantial 
constitutional dimensions. 
Although Utah courts have not ruled on this issue, the first prong of the Berry inquiry 
should be limited to the jurisdiction of Utah. The Utah Constitution governs the activity of 
this state's legislature and judiciary. The fact that an individual may be able to be heard in 
another jurisdiction's court should be deemed insufficient to satisfy the requirement for an 
effective and reasonable alternative. 
Because no reasonable and adequate substitute remedy exists for Mike Liska, the 
Court must make an inquiry into the second prong of the Berry analysis. The objective of 
failing to provide Mike Liska a Utah forum for the continuing enforcement of the Utah 
divorce decree must serve to eliminate a clear social or economic evil. If a clear social or 
economic evil can be identified, the Court must determine if the elimination of the remedy is 
not an arbitrary or unreasonable means for achieving the social or economic objective. 
The UCCJA was enacted, among other reasons, to avoid jurisdictional competition and 
conflict. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45c-l(l)(a) (1992). Accepting this as a clear social evil to be 
addressed by the legislature, allowing deferral of jurisdiction was an arbitrary and 
unreasonable means of achieving the objective. At the very least, the trial court's action 
under Section 7 in this case was an arbitrary and unreasonable. The issue surrounding 
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visitation could have been easily resolved in Utah. Trent v. Trent, 735 P.2d 382 (Utah 1987) 
(Utah court did not abuse discretion by entering order concerning visitation pursuant to a Utah 
divorce decree even though children were with custodial parent in Idaho and had never lived 
in Utah). The Utah courts entered the divorce decree that set out the visitation at issue here. 
Any factors that may weigh in favor of Colorado jurisdiction are not sufficient to relieve the 
Utah courts of the duty to allow Mike Liska remedies related to a Utah divorce decree. 
C. The procedure used by the Commissioner violates the Open Courts provision. 
Mike Liska's second claim under Section 11 of the Utah Constitution does not address 
the nature of the remedy afforded. Instead, the claim focuses upon the first clause of the 
provision, "All courts shall be open." The Commissioner conducted the only fact finding 
related to Mike Liska's Order to Show Cause, communication with the Colorado magistrate. 
This conversation occurred without the presences of Mike Liska or his counsel and without 
maintaining a record. This procedure violates the spirit and the letter of Section 11. 
This portion of Mike Liska's Open Courts claim is similar to the notice and 
opportunity to be heard under the state's due process clause. This claim is also cognizable 
under Section 11. The Supreme Court has held, "By allowing plaintiff to be deprived of its 
liquor store without notice, hearing or any judicial review, [the statute] offends against both 
the Article I, Section 7 guarantee of due process and the Article I, Section 11 guarantee of 
access to the courts." Celebrity Club, 657 P.2d at 1296. The Berry case states that Section 
11 does not only guarantee access but also ensures a fair and equitable judicial procedure. 
Berry, 111 P.2d at 675. 
The Commissioner's communications with the Colorado magistrate should be 
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considered a "court" for purposes of the Open Courts provision. The Commissioner was 
acting under the direction of the trial court in its communication with Colorado. UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 78-3-31(7)(b) (1992) (the presiding judge in the district in which a commissioner 
serves is responsible for the day to day supervision of that commissioner). By not affording 
Mike Liska or his attorney notice or opportunity to be heard at the only fact finding stage of 
the proceeding surrounding Mike Liska's Order to Show Cause, Mike Liska was denied his 
constitutionally guaranteed right to a court that is "open." 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Defendant/Appellant requests that the order of the Third 
District Court be reversed and the case be remanded to the District Court with instructions for 
further proceedings consistent with this Court's decision. 
DATED this 11th day of JulyHS94. 
James A. ftlclntyre 
Attorney for the Appellant 
Margaret |§. Gentles 
Attorney for the Appellant 
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Vickers Energy Corp., Del.Supr., 429 A.2d 
497 (1981). 
Given the unusual history and circum-
stances of this case, we conclude that it 
was error for the trial court to foreclose 
equitable relief to any shareholder who sur-
rendered his or her shares for payment of 
the merger price by exclusion from the 
class of minority shareholders entitled to 
share in the quasi-appraisal remedy. All 
class members who did not vote in favor of 
the merger should receive the increased 
valuation of $7.27 per share fixed by the 
court. 
* * * * * * 
The judgment of the Court of Chancery 
is AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in 
part, and REMANDED for further pro-
ceedings consistent herewith. 
Cathy S. YOST, Respondent 
Below, Appellant, 
v. 
Loral JOHNSON, Petitioner 
Below, Appellee. 
Supreme Court of Delaware. 
Submitted: Dec. 18, 1990. 
Decided: April 12, 1991. 
Rehearing Denied May 10, 1991. 
Father sought modification of custody 
decree in order to obtain custody of chil-
dren. The Family Court, Sussex County, 
awarded custody to father, and mother ap-
pealed. The Supreme Court, Moore, J., 
held that trial court was without jurisdic-
tion to determine custody dispute. 
Reversed. 
1. Constitutional Law <s=274(5) 
Divorce <S=402(8) 
Family court's ex parte communication 
with judge in state which had issued custo-
dy decree, from which court determined 
that it had jurisdiction over custody dispute 
because other state had deferred adjudica-
tion to family court, violated due process 
rights of parents; absent emergency, court 
had duty to notify parties of intended com-
munication in advance, so as to permit 
them to meaningfully participate in discus-
sion. U.S.C.A. Const.Amends. 5, 14; Del. 
C.Ann. Const. Art. 1, § 9; 13 Del.C. 
§ 1903(4). 
2. Trial ®=>21 
Judge should not engage in substan-
tive ex parte communication concerning 
merits of issue pending before court; if 
emergency requires such communication, 
judge must at least maintain proper writ-
ten record and thereafter provide parties 
opportunity to be heard on issues relating 
to, or arising from, such communication. 
U.S.C.A. ConstAmends. 5, 14; Del.C.Ann. 
Const. Art. 1, § 9. 
3. Divorce <s=>402(8) 
Children's visitation with father in 
state over period of several years did not 
establish "significant connection" with 
state, as required for exercise of jurisdic-
tion over custody dispute; children had 
continuously lived with custodial parent in 
another jurisdiction, with their only pro-
longed contact in state occurring after non-
custodial parent refused to return children 
to custodial parent. 13 Del.C. § 1903(2). 
4. Divorce <3=>402(8) 
Father's affidavit, stating that he had 
contacted "intake officers" in Virginia, 
where custody decree had been entered, 
and been advised to file his petition for 
modification of custody in Delaware, where 
he resided, because wife no longer resided 
in Virginia, did not establish that Virginia 
had deferred jurisdiction over custody dis-
pute to Delaware, for purpose of establish-
ing Delaware family court's jurisdiction 
over dispute; "intake officers" had no judi-
cial authority, and thus their opinions were 
not entitled to any preclusive or conclusive 
YOST v. 
Cite as, Dei.Supr., 
effect in Delaware court. 13 Del.C. 
§ 1903(4). 
Upon appeal from the Family Court. 
REVERSED AND VACATED. 
Aida Waserstein, Waserstein & Demsey, 
Wilmington, for appellant. 
Robert G. Gibbs, Wilson, Halbrook & Ba-
yard, Georgetown, for appellee. 
Before CHRISTIE, C.J., HORSEY and 
MOORE, JJ. 
MOORE, Justice. 
This case arises out of a custody dispute 
in Family Court between Loral R. Johnson, 
a resident of Delaware, and Cathy S. Yost, 
a resident of Vicenza, Italy. Two decisions 
of that court are at issue. In the first case, 
the Family Court held that it had subject 
matter jurisdiction over the custody dispute 
pursuant to the Uniform Child Custody Act 
("UCCJA") as enacted in Delaware. In its 
second decision, the court awarded custody 
of the parties' two children, Mark and Ian, 
to their natural father, Loral R. Johnson. 
We find that the Family Court never had 
subject matter jurisdiction over this case. 
The court deprived Yost of her due process 
rights when it exclusively relied on an ex 
parte communication to determine that De-
laware was a proper forum under 13 DelC. 
§ 1903(4). We also conclude that the trial 
court had no jurisdiction in this case under 
the UCCJA. Accordingly, we reverse the 
judgments below in their entirety. 
I. 
Loral R. Johnson and Cathy S. Yost were 
divorced in Pennsylvania on October 31, 
1981. The original divorce decree con-
tained a custody and visitation agreement 
giving Yost custody of her two children. 
Yost later moved to Virginia with the chil-
dren, and Johnson moved to Delaware in 
August, 1983. 
On April 27, 1982, the Juvenile and Do-
mestic Relations Court of Fairfax County, 
Virginia, entered a new order which only 
affected the visitation provisions of the 
original Pennsylvania decree. Pursuant to 
JOHNSON Del. 179 
591 A.2d 178 (1991) 
the new Virginia visitation schedule, John-
son was entitled to visit his children one 
weekend per month, the first three weeks 
of July, and alternating Christmas and 
Thanksgiving holidays. Johnson regularly 
visited his children between April, 1982 and 
September, 1988. 
Yost married an Air Force sergeant 
while she was living in Virginia. The fami-
ly mo^ -d to Italy in July, 1988, after Yost's 
husband voluntarily accepted a four-year 
military assignment. There was no evi-
dence in the record that Yost's move sur-
prised Johnson. There also was no evi-
dence in the record that Johnson objected 
to the move. The children next visited 
Johnson in Delaware between June 5 and 
July 25, 1989. At the end of the visit, 
Johnson did not return the children to Italy 
and attempted to modify the Virginia de-
cree in Delaware. 
A. 
Johnson filed a petition in the Family 
Court seeking emergency temporary custo-
dy of the children. The Family Court de-
nied the motion, but scheduled the matter 
for a hearing and issued an order prohibit-
ing Johnson from removing the children 
from Delaware. Yost arrived from Italy 
and filed her own petition seeking the 
court's permission to take the children to 
Virginia pending the outcome of the Dela-
ware proceedings. The court granted 
Yost's petition. In re Johnson, Del.Fam., 
No. 89-7-119CV, Millman, J. (July 27, 1989) 
(ORDER). At the initial hearing, the court 
issued a briefing schedule to address 
Yost's challenge to the Family Court's jur-
isdiction. In re Johnson, Del.Fam., No. 
89-7-119CV, Conner, J. (Aug. 7, 1989) 
(EMERGENCY ORDER). The trial judge 
permitted Yost to return to Italy with the 
children while the matter was pending. Id. 
Finally, on November 3, 1989, the trial 
court issued its decision denying Yost's mo-
tion to dismiss for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction. See In re Johnson, Del.Fam., 
No. 89-7-119CV, Millman, J. (Nov. 3, 1989) 
(ORDER). The court held a trial on the 
merits of Johnson's custody petition on 
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April 25, 1990. The court rendered an oral 
opinion awarding custody of both children 
to Johnson on May 4, 1990. The court 
memorialized its oral opinion in a written 
order dated May 15, 1990. See In re John-
son, Del.Fam., No. 89-7-119CV, Millman, 
J. (May 15, 1990) (ORDER). 
Yost appeals to this Court, contesting 
both: (1) the Family Court's Order dated 
November 3, 1990, finding jurisdiction; and 
(2) its decisions on the merits of the custo-
dy claim rendered in the Spring of 1990. 
We heard oral argument on December 18, 
1990, and immediately issued an order re-
turning custody of Mark and Ian Johnson 
to their mother. See Yost v. Johnson, Del. 
Supr., No. 179, 1990, Moore, J. (Dec. 19, 
1990) (ORDER). We stated in our order 
that this opinion more fully explicating our 
views would follow. 
We conclude that it is unnecessary to 
reach the merits of the Family Court's deci-
sion to award custody of Mark and Ian to 
their natural father. We find that the 
Family Court committed legal error, and 
violated Yost's due process rights when it 
ruled, on the basis of an ex parte communi-
cation with a Virginia court, that it had 
subject matter jurisdiction to decide this 
case under the UCCJA as enacted in Dela-
ware. See 13 DeLC. §§ 1901-1925. 
B. 
The Family Court held that it had subject 
matter jurisdiction to consider Johnson's 
custody petition pursuant to Section Three 
of the UCCJA. In re Johnson, Del.Fam., 
No. 89-7-119CV, Millman, J. (Nov. 3, 1989) 
(ORDER) ("ORDER"); 13 DeLC. § 1903. 
Section Three of the UCCJA, as enacted in 
Delaware, provides four distinct "tests" to 
determine whether a court has subject mat-
ter jurisdiction: 
(1) This State: 
a. Is the home state of the child at 
the time of the commencement of the 
proceeding; or 
b. Had been the child's home state 
within 6 months before commencement 
of the proceedings and the child is 
1. 13 DeLC. § 1903(3) was not at issue in this 
absent from this State because of his 
removal or retention by a person claim-
ing his custody or for other reasons, 
and a parent or person acting as par-
ent continues to live in this State; or 
(2) It is in the best interests of the child 
that a court of this State assume jurisdic-
tion because: 
a. The child and his parents, or the 
child and at least 1 contestant, have a 
significant connection with this State; 
and 
b. There is available in this State sub-
stantial evidence concerning the child's 
present or future care, protection, 
training and personal relationships; or 
(3) The child is physically present in this 
State and: 
a. The child has been abandoned; or 
b. It is necessary in an emergency to 
protect the child because he has been 
subjected or threatened with mistreat-
ment or abuse or is otherwise neglect-
ed or dependent; or 
(4) It appears that no other state would 
have jurisdiction under prerequisites sub-
stantially in accordance with subdivisions 
(1), (2) and (3) of this section, or another 
state has declined to exeHse jurisdiction 
on the ground that this b.ate is the more 
appropriate forum to determine the cus-
tody of the child, and it is in the best 
interests of the child that this court as-
sume jurisdiction 
13 DeLC. § 1903 (emphasis added). 
The trial court specifically rejected John-
son's arguments that it could accept juris-
diction under 13 DeLC. §§ 1903(1) & (2).1 
See In re Johnson, Order at 3-4. The 
court ruled that the "children did not have 
a significant connection" to Delaware. Id. 
at 4. However, the Family Court found 
jurisdiction under 13 DeLC. § 1903(4), rul-
ing that the Virginia Family Court had 
effectively deferred adjudication of the cus-
tody issue to Delaware See 13 DeLC 
§ 1903(4); In re Johnso , Order at 4. 
The trial judge reached this conclusion 
after consulting with Judge James W. 
Fourqurean of the Virginia Juvenile and 
case. 
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Domestic Relations District Court, Nine-
teenth Judicial District in an ex parte tele-
phone call. The Family Court Judge ac-
knowledged: 
I contacted the Honorable James W. 
Fourqurean of the Juvenile and Domestic 
Relations Court of Fairfax County, Virgi-
nia. Judge Fourqurean deferred to this 
Court the decision on the issue of custo-
dy of these children. His decision was 
based on the fact that the respondent 
and the children have not lived in Virgi-
nia since July 15, 1988. It was Judge 
Fourqurean's belief that the issue of 
domicile was not significant. It was 
Judge Fourqurean's belief that the physi-
cal residence of the children was of more 
importance than domicile since in decid-
ing the issue of custody, consideration of 
housing, schooling, neighborhood envi-
ronment, friends, family and medical 
needs, among other things, needed to be 
examined and it was his belief these is-
sues could only be properly addressed by 
the courts of Delaware or Italy. In re 
Johnson, Order at 3 n. 1 (emphasis add-
ed). 
Even though there was no other record 
of the t . \\ judge's conversation with Judge 
Fourqurean, and no written decision to me-
morialize Judge Fourqurean's conclusions, 
the Family Court decided that Virginia had 
effectively "declined jurisdiction." Id. at 4. 
See also In re Johnson, Del.Fam., No. 
89-7-119CV, Millman, J. (May 15, 1990) 
(ORDER) (Family Court can consider mer-
its of custody petition because "Virginia 
relinquished jurisdiction to this Court."). 
Yost argues on appeal that the trial 
court's reliance on 13 Del.C § 1903(4) was 
totally misplaced. She claims that the 
Family Court violated her rights to proce-
dural due process when it: (1) contacted 
the Virginia court without notifying the 
parties; (2) failed to permit the parties to 
participate in the telephone conversation; 
and (3) failed to create or produce a written 
record of the call. Yost also argues that 
the trial court erred by not considering 
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Italy as a more proper forum to hear the 
case under the UCCJA. 
Johnson contends that the UCCJA autho-
rized the trial judge to contact the Virginia 
Court on an ex parte basis. He thus ar-
gues the Family Court did not violate 
Yost's due process rights. Johnson also 
claims that Virginia had effectively de-
clined subject matter jurisdiction in this 
case. He refutes Yost's argument that 
Italy is the proper forum to consider this 
case and maintains that Yost cannot raise 
the issue of Italian jurisdiction for the first 
time on appeal. Johnson finally argues 
that the UCCJA prohibits the court from 
considering Italy a proper forum even if 
Yost could contest the Family Court's juris-
diction. 
II. 
We start with the relevant standard of 
review. Yost contends that the trial court 
violated her due process rights guaranteed 
under the United States and Delaware Con-
stitutions. She also claims that the Family 
Court misapplied the UCCJA. This Court 
will review questions of law de novo to 
determine whether the trial court commit-
ted legal errors. See Ruggles v. Riggs, 
Del.Supr., 477 A.2d 697, 703-04 (1984); Fi-
duciary Trust Co. N. Y. v. Fiduciary Trust 
Co. N.Y., Del.Supr., 445 A.2d 927, 930 
(1982). 
A. 
Turning to the merits of the appeal, we 
find that the trial court's ex parte commu-
nication with the Virginia judge resulted in 
a serious violation of Yost's constitutional 
rights to procedural due process. See U.S. 
CONST, amend. XIV, § 1. DEL. CONST, 
art. I, § 9; cf State v. Rose, Del.Super., 
132 A. 864, 868-69 (1926) (meaning of "due 
process" substantively same under United 
States and Delaware Constitutions). 
This Court has previously stated in Rug-
gles v. Riggs, Del.Supr., 477 A.2d 697 (1984) 
that: 
In the courts of Delaware persons are to 
be accorded the most scrupulous adher-
ence to the constitutional mandate of due 
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process . . . The Family Court is no 
exception to that unalterable rule. All 
A.2d at 703 (citations omitted) (emphasis 
added). 
The hallmark of due process in a civil pro-
ceeding before a Delaware court is notice 
and an opportunity to be heard. See Per-
rine v. Pennroad Corp., Del.Supr., 47 A.2d 
479, 486, cert denied, 329 U.S. 808, 67 
S.Ct. 620, 91 L.Ed. 690 (1946); Aprile v. 
State, Del.Super., 143 A.2d 739, 744, affd, 
146 A.2d 180 (1958). As the Superior Court 
stated in Aprile: 
Due Process in judicial proceedings im-
plies action in conformity with the gener-
al law based upon evidence, and after a 
full hearing upon notice to the party 
or parties affected and an opportunity 
to be heard. 143 A.2d at 744 (emphasis 
added). 
[1,2] The trial judge impermissibly con-
tacted Judge Fourqurean without notifying 
either Johnson or Yost. He then relied 
upon this ex parte communication to reach 
the conclusion that Virginia had effectively 
surrendered jurisdiction over Johnson's 
custody petition to the Delaware Family 
Court. There is no evidence that the Fami-
ly Court kept a written record of the con-
versation. There was neither notice nor an 
opportunity for the parties to be heard on 
this significant issue. 
The trial judge's action in this case repre-
sents a departure from acceptable notions 
of due process guaranteed under the Dela-
ware Constitution. A judge should not en-
gage in a substantive ex parte communica-
tion concerning the merits of an issue pend-
ing before the court. See, e.g., Ruggles, 
All A.2d at 702 ("ex parte consultation by 
a trial judge with experts has no place in 
the judicial process."); Phillips v. Del. 
Power & Light Co., Del.Supr., 216 A.2d 
281, 285 (1966); Barks v. Herzberg, Del. 
Supr., 206 A.2d 507, 509 (1965). 
This case did not present an emergency 
situation which might necessitate an ex 
2. 13 Del.C § 1907(d) provides: 
Before determining whether to decline or re-
tain jurisdiction, the court may communicate 
with a court of another state and exchange 
information pertinent to the assumption of 
parte communication. Furthermore, even 
in emergency situations, the trial judge 
must at least maintain a proper written 
record of the ex parte communication and 
thereafter provide the parties the opportu-
nity to be heard on the issues relating to, 
or arising from, the communication. Ab-
sent an emergency, the trial judge had a 
fundamental duty to notify the parties of 
the intended communication in advance, 
and to permit them to meaningfully partic-
ipate in the discussion. Anything less does 
not comport with basic principles of due 
process. Eberly v. Eberly, Del.Supr., 489 
A.2d 433, 440-43 (1985); Abdel G.S. v. 
Badrban H.K., Del.Supr., 453 A.2d 94, 96 
(1982). 
Johnson also argues that the due process 
issue is not dispositive because the UCCJA 
encourages judges to communicate directly 
with each other. He specifically claims 
that the Family Court was authorized to 
communicate directly with Judge Fourqure-
an under the forum non conveniens sec-
tion of the UCCJA. See 13 Del.C. 
§ 1907(d).2 On closer inspection, Johnson's 
claim is meritless. 
Johnson clearly confuses subject matter 
jurisdiction with the doctrine oi forum non 
conveniens. Delaware has long recog-
nized forum non conveniens as a common 
law remedy enabling a court to transfer a 
case to a venue more convenient to the 
parties. See Miller v. Phillips Petroleum 
Co. Norway, Del.Supr., 537 A.2d 190, 201-
02 (1988); Parvin v. Kaufman, Del.Supr., 
236 A.2d 425, 427 (1967); Dietrich v. Texas 
Natl Petroleum Co., Del.Super., 193 A.2d 
579, 584-88 (1963); Winsor v. United Air-
lines Inc., Del.Super., 154 A.2d 561, 563 
(1958). An underlying assumption of the 
forum non conveniens doctrine is that 
both the original court and the proposed 
new venue have subject matter jurisdiction 
to consider the case. As the Supreme 
Court of the United States ruled many 
years ago, 'forum non conveniens can 
never apply if there is absence of jurisdic-
t ion. . . ." Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 
jurisdiction by either court with a view to 
assuring that jurisdiction will be exercised by 
the more appropriate court and that a forum 
will be available to the parties. 
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U.S. 501, 504, 67 S.Ct. 839, 841, 91 L.Ed. 
1055 (1947) (emphasis added); Dietrich, 
193 A.2d at 586. 
The Delaware UCCJA does not modify 
the common law doctrine of forum non 
conveniens. Section 1907(a) clearly pro-
vides that only "[a] court which has juris-
diction under this chapter" is authorized to 
consider whether to apply the doctrine. 13 
DelC. § 1907(a). The official commentary 
to the UCCJA confirms that the forum 
non conveniens section was intended only 
as a secondary inquiry once a court had 
already established primary subject matter 
jurisdiction. See Comment UCCJA Section 
Seven, reprinted in 1 J. McCAHEY, M. 
KAUFMAN, C. KRAUT & J. ZETT, 
CHILD CUSTODY VISITATION AND 
LAW PRACTICE 3A-60 (1990) (Section 
Seven "serves as a second check on juris-
diction once the test of sections 3 [13 
DelC. § 1903] or 14 has been met") 
B. 
[3] Johnson also argues that resolution 
of Yost's due process claim is not disposi-
tive because the Family Court had an inde-
pendent basis to establish subject matter 
jurisdiction. Johnson relies on an affidavit 
he submitted to the trial court as conclu-
sive proof that Virginia had declined juris-
diction. He therefore concludes that the 
trial court properly considered his petition 
under 13 DelC. § 1903(4).3 
[4] According to his affidavit, Johnson 
contacted a Fairfax, Virginia "intake offi-
cer" on July 24, 1989, and asked whether 
he should file a custody modification peti-
tion in Virginia. This was almost at the 
end of the children's visit in Delaware. 
3. Johnson also argues that the Family Court 
could have found subject matter jurisdiction un-
der 13 DelC. § 1903(2) even if the court im-
properly assessed the Virginia jurisdiction ques-
tion under 13 DelC. § 1903(4). Johnson claims 
that he and the children established the statuto-
rily mandated "significant connection" with De-
laware through "a period of six years of visita-
tion." 13 DelC. § 1903(2). 
Johnson's claim is untenable given the Family 
Court's reluctance to assume jurisdiction pursu-
ant to 13 DelC. § 1903(2) when there is short 
physical contact with Delaware and the bulk of 
the treatment and care of the children is clearly 
in another state. See Fielder v. Thorn, Del.Fam., 
525 A.2d 576, 579 (1987), Grayson v. Grayson, 
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The affidavit recites that the "intake offi-
cer" told Johnson to file his petition in 
Delaware because "Mrs. Yost no longer 
had residence or ties" in Virginia. The 
affidavit also mentions that Johnson con-
tacted a second Virginia "intake officer" on 
July 28, 1989. This second "intake officer" 
also advised Johnson to file a petition in 
Delaware. Johnson's counsel admitted at 
oral argument that Johnson never sought 
the independent legal advice of Virginia 
counsel either before or after his discus-
sions with the two Virginia "intake offi-
cers." 
We note that the trial court did not ex-
plicitly consider Johnson's affidavit when it 
decided that it had subject matter jurisdic-
tion. Nonetheless, we find that Johnson's 
affidavit cannot serve as conclusive proof 
that Virginia declined jurisdiction in this 
case. 
Article Four, Section One of the United 
States Constitution provides that a state 
court must give "Full Faith and Credit" to 
the "judicial proceedings of every other 
State." U.S. CONST. Art. 4, § 1. The 
Delaware courts have long recognized that 
the Full Faith and Credit clause is only 
applicable where a foreign jurisdiction has 
both subject matter and personal jurisdic-
tion over the defendant and renders a 
"duly authenticated" final decision. See, 
e.g., Iowa-Wisconsin Bridge Co. v. Phoe-
nix Finance Corp., Del.Supr , 25 A.2d 383, 
391, cert, denied, 317 U.S. 671, 63 S.Ct. 79, 
87 L.Ed. 539 (1942); Bata v. Hill, Del.Ch., 
139 A.2d 159, 165 (1958); Brown v. Ins. 
Equities Corp., Del.Ch., 21 Del.Ch. 273, 
187 A. 18, 19 (1936); Sanson v. Sevison, 
Del.Super., 396 A.2d 178, 181-82 (1978). 
DelFam., 454 A 2d 1297, 1300 (1982) ("[t]he 
term 'significant connection' is authoritatively 
defined as maximum rather than minimum con-
tact with the state and is intended to limit juris-
diction rather than to proliferate it.") (empha-
sis in original). The bulk of contacts in this 
case is clearly not in Delaware. Especially in 
view of Grayson, this Court cannot authorize the 
Family Court to assume jurisdiction in a case 
where the children continuously lived with their 
mother in Italy for many years and the only 
prolonged contact that Johnson and the chil-
dren shared with Delaware occurred after John-
son refused to return his children to their moth-
er. See, e.g., Grayson, 454 A.2d at 1300-01. 
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Accordingly, Delaware will recognize a for-
eign judgment only if it was issued in con-
formity with due process. Id. 
As reported in Johnson's affidavit, the 
judgment of two Virginia "intake officers" 
that Virginia did not have jurisdiction over 
the modification of custody petition is not 
entitled to any preclusive or conclusive ef-
fect in a Delaware court. There is abso-
lutely no evidence that either "intake offi-
cer" was imbued with judicial authority. 
Indeed, it is even questionable whether the 
"intake officers" were authorized to give 
the alleged advice attributed to them. 
Even if Johnson's inquiries were somehow 
deemed "judicial proceedings," the record 
clearly indicates that the "proceedings" vio-
lated due process, because Yost had abso-
4. We note that the Virginia court may have 
deferred jurisdiction to Italy if Johnson had 
filed his child custody modification petition in 
Virginia. Yost argued that Italy could satisfy 
the first two jurisdictional tests of UCCJA Sec-
tion Three because the children had continuous-
ly resided in that country for at least one year 
preceding Johnson's suit. Johnson, however, 
correctly argued that Section Three only refers 
to residence in a "state." He also correctly 
claimed that the UCCJA defines a "state" as 
"any state, territory or possession of the United 
States, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and 
the District of Columbia." 13 DeLC. § 1902(10). 
Johnson therefore concluded that the Italian 
courts should never obtain jurisdiction. 
No state court has yet resolved the issue 
whether a foreign country can qualify as a 
"state" within the meaning of Section Three of 
the UCCJA. However, in a case that mirrors the 
present dispute, the Virginia Supreme Court 
ruled that England qualified as a "state" within 
the meaning of the forum non conveniens sec-
tion of the UCCJA. See Middleton v. Middleton, 
227 Va. 82, 95, 314 S.E.2d 362, 368 (Va.1984). 
Middleton involved a custody dispute between 
a separated couple. The husband resided in 
Virginia and the mother lived in England. Ac-
cording to a Virginia custody agreement, the 
children lived in England and visited their fa-
ther on summer vacations. 227 Va. at 88, 314 
S.E.2d at 364. During one summer visitation, 
the father decided not to return the children 
and sought to modify the custody decree in 
Virginia without warning his estranged wife. 
Id. The mother flew to Virginia and took her 
children back to England. Id. She then insti-
tuted a custody suit in the English courts and 
requested the Virginia court to defer its judg-
ment pending the outcome of the foreign suit. 
Id. 
The parties in Middleton both agreed that Vir-
ginia had subject matter jurisdiction. Instead, 
lutely no notice or opportunity to contest 
the "intake officers" findings. 
We conclude that the trial court had no 
authority to modify Johnson's custody peti-
tion under the UCCJA. The Family Court 
violated Yost's due process rights, and 
lacked an independent rationale to find sub-
ject matter jurisdiction under the UCCJA.4 
Thus, the Family Court's decision to uphold 
subject matter jurisdiction on the basis of 
the default provision of 13 DeLC. § 1903(4) 
was incorrect under the circumstances. 
Accordingly, the judgments of the Family 
Court are hereby REVERSED. 
the mother requested Virginia to defer to the 
English court's decision under the forum non 
conveniens section of the UCCJA. The relevant 
section of the Virginia version of the UCCJA 
provides that a court should defer judgment if 
"a court of another state is a more appropriate 
forum." Id. at 94, 314 S.E.2d at 368 (emphasis 
added). 
Middleton decided to give the term "state" a 
liberal interpretation to help effectuate the gen-
eral purposes of the UCCJA. Id. The Virginia 
Supreme Court reasoned that recognizing Eng-
land as a "state" was justifiable under the 
UCCJA because: (1) English law was very sim-
ilar to Virginia jurisprudence; (2) England had 
a closer connection between the mother and her 
children; and (3) most of the relevant evidence 
was located in England. Id. at 94-95, 314 
S.E.2d at 367-68. 
Middleton also recognized the procedural ad-
vantage the father obtained when he refused to 
return his children to England. The court not-
ed: 
While father did not "snatch" the children in 
the true sense of the word, he engaged in an 
equivalent act by refusing to return them in 
violation of a visitation agreement; he pro-
cured a tactical advantage by his conduct. Id. 
at 95-96, 314 S.E.2d at 369. 
We were also mindful of the tactical advan-
tage Johnson secured when he "contacted" Vir-
ginia and then chose to file his petition in the 
Delaware Family Court the next day. Johnson's 
counsel even admitted at oral argument that the 
Virginia court would probably have found that 
Italy was a proper forum under Middleton. Al-
though we express no view as to the motives 
underlying Johnson's conduct in this matter, we 
will not permit parties in a custody dispute to 
"forum shop" with the Delaware courts in com-
plete derogation of the stated purposes of the 
UCCJA. Id. at 91-94, 314 S.E.2d at 366-367. 
